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Abstract—The optimal power allocation for block fading (BF)
networks with confidential messages is investigated under an
M -block delay and power constraint. First, we study networks
without channel state information (CSI) feedback to the trans-
mitter and demonstrate that the optimal power allocation is
the equidistribution of the power budget, denoted as the “blind
policy”. In blind scenarios secrecy can be achieved though
receiver diversity; the probability of secrecy outage (PSO) is
shown to decay exponentially with the the diversity order of
the legitimate user. Then, we investigate networks with CSI
feedback. For comparison purposes, we restate the acausal secure
waterfilling algorithm with full CSI before moving to the causal
feedback scenario. In the latter, an approximate “threshold
policy” for the low SNR and an approximate “high power
policy” for the high SNR regimes are derived. Furthermore, a
novel universal transmission policy is proposed across all SNRs,
denoted as the “blind horizon approximation” (BHA). Through
numerical results, the BHA policy is shown to outperform both
the threshold and high power policies when the legitimate user
has an SNR advantage with respect to the eavesdropper, while
it also compares well with the secure waterfilling policy.
Index Terms—Secrecy capacity, probability of secrecy outage,
block fading, BF-AWGN channel, causal channel state informa-
tion feedback, dynamic program
I. INTRODUCTION
The increasing deployment of wireless networks intro-
duces new challenges in the design of enhanced security
next generation systems. A pressing need to develop alter-
native/complementary means to secure data exchange arises
in many wireless settings with limited feedback and limited
resources. Physical layer security (PLS) is an emerging techno-
logy from the area of information theory that can address open
security issues in challenging wireless applications such as
those envisaged for fifth generation (5G) networks. In PLS
approaches [1], the issues of reliability and secrecy in the
exchange of information are jointly addressed by employing
novel double binning encoding schemes.
PLS was pioneered by Wyner, who introduced the wiretap
channel and established the possibility of creating perfectly
secure communication links without relying on private (secret)
keys [2]. Wyner termed the rates at which information can be
transmitted secretly from the source to its intended destina-
tion as achievable secrecy rates, and the maximal achievable
secrecy rate as the secrecy capacity (SC). Following Wyner’s
contribution, the SC of the scalar Gaussian wiretap channel
was analyzed in [3]. In [4], Wyner’s approach was generalized
to the transmission of confidential messages over broadcast
channels. Renewed interest in the area over the last two
decades led to the characterization of the SC of the quasi-
static fading channel in [5], followed by the characterization
of the delay unconstrained SC of the ergodic fading channel in
[6]. In parallel, in [7], the capacity-equivocation region of the
generic parallel broadcast channel with confidential messages
(BCC) was derived and the results were applied to various
classes of broadcast channels (including the ergodic fading
channel). Furthermore the rapidly expanding literature on
PLS topics, includes contributions for: multiple input multiple
output (MIMO) systems [8], [9], interference and multiple
access channels [10], [11], multi-user scenarios [12], and relay
and cooperative networks [13], [14] while in [15] a novel triple
binning scheme using standard QAM modulators to achieve
strong secrecy in PNC applications has been developed, to cite
but a few.
In this contribution we investigate the SC and the probabi-
lity of secrecy outage (PSO) of block fading additive white
Gaussian noise (BF-AWGN) channels (i) without feedback or
(ii) with causal feedback of the channel state information (CSI)
to the transmitter. The general class of BF-AWGN channels
without confidential messages was investigated in [16], [17],
[18] and [19]. Previous work on the secrecy rates of BF
channels have looked at different aspects of the topic. For
example, in [20] the secrecy degrees of freedom of multi-
antenna block fading (BF) coefficients were investigated by
exploiting the temporal correlation of the BF channels seen
by different receivers. Furthermore, in [21] distributed systems
with linear precoding were studied while in [22] point-to-point
secure communication over flat fading channels under outage
constraints were considered. In the same contribution capac-
ity achieving schemes based on opportunistically exchanging
private keys between the legitimate nodes were proposed.
Furthermore, in [23] the SC of the ergodic BF wiretap channel
with partial CSI at the transmitter and perfect CSI at the
receivers was studied.
Our work differs from previous contributions as we ex-
plicitly focus on delay constrained BF-AWGN channels, as
opposed to ergodic scenarios. In particular with respect to the
ergodic scenario, [6] and [7] presume that all channel realiza-
tions occur during encoding, whereas in our investigation (i)
we consider the more realistic setting in which only a finite
number of channel realizations occur during encoding, and,
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or parallel (instead of strictly parallel), i.e., we explicitly look
into causal channels as well. In the investigated system model
a source wishes to broadcast to an intended destination secret
messages which are spread over M blocks of N symbols.
Each block of N symbols is assumed to undergo the same
channel state (fading); accordingly, at the source a (stochastic)
encoder maps the confidential messages to codewords of
length n = MN transmitted over M independent blocks, i.e.,
we assume that an interleaver of at most depth M is employed.
The fading realizations are modeled to be independent and
identically distributed (i.i.d) random variables, i.e., they remain
constant over each block of N channel uses and change
independently from one block to the next.
For M = 1, this study reduces to the quasi-static fading
channel [5], while for M → ∞ the delay unconstrained
ergodic fading channel arises [6], [7]. For finite M , the BF-
AWGN channel is typically not information-stable. By letting
N → ∞ though, we can give operational meaning to the
concept of the delay limited SC which is closely related
to the PSO; in agreement to intuition we remark that the
delay limited SC is the rate that minimizes the PSO. This
result is very useful as it allows to convert a non-convex
optimization problem - that of minimizing the PSO - to a
convex optimization problem - that of maximizing the delay
limited SC.
To the best of our knowledge, the present paper presents the
first systematic study of the following aspects of BF-AWGN
channels with secrecy and delay constraints:
- Systems without CSI feedback: Absence of CSI feedback is
typical in broadcasting applications with multiple destinations
or one-way networks consisting of a large number of resource
limited devices, e.g., sensor networks, etc. In the “blind”
scenario we formulate the problem of maximizing the expected
value of the secrecy rate as a dynamic program (DP) and derive
an analytic solution, which states that the optimal resource
allocation is to equally distribute the overall power budget
across all M -blocks. We refer to this as the “blind transmission
policy” and provide novel closed form expressions for the PSO
as a function of the diversity orders of the legitimate user and
the eavesdropper in the generic multi-antenna or multi-user
setting. An interesting outcome of this investigation is that
for small secrecy rates the PSO decays exponentially with the
diversity order of the legitimate user.
- Systems with causal CSI feedback: Causal CSI feedback
is typical in time division channels. Additionally, the full
CSI may be available to the source in networks consisting
of benign nodes with different access rights to the transmitted
information [24], i.e., when the eavesdropper is a legitimate
node in the network not authorized to receive certain content.
Using the assumption that the full CSI is revealed to the
transmitter causally before the decision on the power allocation
is made, we formulate the problem as a DP. However, unlike
the "blind" case, we cannot derive analytical solutions for the
DP. Thus, we use the DP formulation to derive three distinct
sub-optimal resource allocation policies that correspond to (i)
a low SNR regime, (ii) a high SNR regime, and (iii) a universal
policy that incorporates the blind policy in the horizon of
future events, denoted as the blind horizon approximation
(BHA). The proposed sub-optimal policies are given in closed
form and require only a few operations (e.g. comparisons and
multiplications). As a result, the proposed policies are very
well suited for resource limited, real-time applications such as
device-to-device communications envisaged for 5G networks.
- Feasibility of PLS in BF-AWGN channels: Through the
present study, the effect of diversity in time or frequency
when M > 1 in the acausal and causal feedback scenarios or
the multi-user or multi-antenna diversity in the blind scenario
are shown to have an important impact on the feasibility of
secrecy. In blind scenarios, we demonstrate that cooperative
wireless networks can be robust to passive attacks when the
diversity order of potential adversaries can be upper bounded.
On the other hand, when either acausal or causal feedback
is available, diversity in the time/frequency can accommodate
secrecy rates compatible with many actual wireless systems.
The paper is organized as follows: Section II introduces
the system model and the delay limited SC and PSO in
BF-AWGN channels. In Section III the formulation of the
power allocation problem using DP is given. In Section IV, for
comparison purposes, the full acausal CSI feedback scenario
in which both the legitimate user’s and the eavesdropper’s
CSIs are acausally available to the transmitter is revisited and
the results of the authors’ contribution in [25] are restated.
In section V the case of causal CSI feedback is investigated
and approximate policies for the low, high and universal SNR
regimes are derived using the DP formulation. An extensive set
of numerical evaluations is presented in section VII. Finally,
the conclusions of this study are summarized in section VIII
where also future research directions are discussed.
II. DELAY LIMITED SECRECY CAPACITY AND
PROBABILITY OF SECRECY OUTAGE
We assume a memoryless BF-AWGN channel with i.i.d.
realizations and three nodes of interest; a source node, a
legitimate user and an eavesdropper. Each transmission block
is assumed to be a general broadcast channel from the source
node to the two receivers. The source node wants to transmit
confidential information to the legitimate user in the presence
of the eavesdropper at the maximal possible rate. At the
transmitter front-end an I-Q modulator is employed and as
a result two independent real transmission paths are available
during each transmission slot due to the employment of two
orthogonal signalling carriers (e.g. a sine and a cosine wave).
As a result, the capacity expressions that hold for real channels
are scaled by a factor of 2. Keeping this in mind, in the
following we will assume that all random variables are real
but drop the coefficient 12 in the capacity expressions. Finally,
all logarithms hereafter are assumed base 2.
Information exchange occurs in frames, each frame con-
sisting of M transmission blocks of N symbols. In one
frame, the vectors of channel gains at the intended and eaves-
dropping receivers are denoted by α = (α1, . . . , αM ) and
β = (β1, . . . , βM ) respectively; during the m-th transmission
block the legitimate user’s channel fading coefficient is
√
αm,
while the eavesdropper’s channel fading coefficient is
√
βm.
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Gaussian noise (AWGN) sources is normalized to unity for
convenience, i.e., the effect of AWGN is incorporated into the
channel gains.
Let x, y, z, w, w˜ be vectors in RMN with x =
(x1, . . . ,xM )T , y = (y1, . . . ,yM )T , z = (z1, . . . ,zM )T ,
w = (w1, . . . ,wM )T , w˜ = (w˜1, . . . , w˜M )T where
xm,ym, zm,wm, w˜m are vectors in RN for m = 1, . . . ,M .
During one frame, the outputs of optimal receivers at the
intended destination, denoted by y, and at the eavesdropper,
denoted by z, are expressed, respectively, as follows:
y = Ax+w, (1)
z = Bx+ w˜, (2)
with A = diag(√α1, . . . ,√αM ) an M ×M diagonal matrix
whose elements are the legitimate destination’s fading ampli-
tudes andB = diag(
√
β1, . . . ,
√
βM ) an M×M diagonal ma-
trix whose elements are the eavesdropper’s fading amplitudes.
The construction of the codeword x is explained in detail in
subsection II-A while the terms w and w˜ are vectors whose
components are zero-mean unit-variance circularly symmetric
Gaussian random variables.
Due to the memoryless assumption in the modeling of the
fading coefficients, the channel output transition probability
distribution is factored over the M independent blocks and is
given by
p(y, z|x) =
M∏
m=1
p(ym, zm|xm). (3)
As a result of (3) the M -block BF-AWGN channel is equiv-
alent to the M -parallel broadcast channel with confidential
messages (eq. (1) in [7]).
A. Delay Limited Secrecy Capacity
During each transmission frame, the transmitter wishes
to convey to the intended destination a message s =
(s(1), . . . , s(q)) ∈ Sq , whose elements are uniformly drawn
from a set of source symbols S. To this end, the source
employs a (stochastic) encoder described by the mapping ϕ :
Sq → (XN1 , . . . ,XNM ), with Xm the m-th encoder alphabet. At
the intended destination, at the end of the transmission frame,
the decoding function φ : (YN1 , . . . ,YNM ) → Sq is used to
recover the source symbols from the observations. The error
probability associated with the code (ϕ, φ) is defined as
Pe = Pr (φ(y) 6= s) . (4)
The level of ignorance of the eavesdropper with respect to the
transmitted message is measured by its equivocation rate Re,
Re =
1
n
H(S|Z). (5)
In the following, we focus on information theoretic weak
secrecy, implying that the equivocation rate is at least equal
to the rate of the message denoted by Rs. Perfectly secret
transmission at rate Rs is achieved if for any arbitrarily small
 > 0, there exists a sequence of codes (2nRs , n) such that
for n→∞, the following hold [2], [4]:
Pe 6  and Re =
1
n
H(S|Z) > Rs − . (6)
During a given transmission frame, the delay limited SC Cs
is the maximum achievable rate Rs that satisfies (6).
Encoder Construction: In order to transmit the message
index s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , 2nRs} we map s to a set of indices
{sm}, m = 1, . . . ,M , by dividing the nRs bits which
correspond to the message index into a set of {NR(m)s } bits
with
∑M
m=1R
(m)
s = Rs and using a power allocation policy
γ = (γ1, . . . , γM ) so that a frame-based power constraint is
satisfied,
M∑
m=1
γm ≤MP, and γm ≥ 0 for m = 1, . . . ,M. (7)
1) Full CSI Feedback: Assuming that during the m-th
block the full CSI (αm, βm) is fedback to the transmitter,
then for each γm we can develop a sequence of (2NR
(m)
s , N)
Gaussian codes using a pair of corresponding encoding and
decoding functions (ϕm, φm) with ϕm : Sqm → XNm ,
φm : YNm → Sqm and
∑M
m=1 qm = q, that achieve the m-
th block SC given by
c(full)s (αm, βm, γm) =
(
log 1 + αmγm(αm, βm)1 + βmγm(αm, βm)
)+
, (8)
such that the m-th block probability of error
P (m)e = Pr (φm(ym 6= sm))→ 0, as N →∞. (9)
Using the above multiplexing strategy, the probability of
decoding error in a frame is upper bounded by
Pe ≤
M−1∑
m=0
P (m)e → 0 (10)
for finite M . As a consequence, for any power policy γ
satisfying the power constraint (7) the secrecy rate R(full)s
is achievable:
R(full)s (α, β, γ(α, β)) =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
c(full)s (αm, βm, γm(αm, βm)).
(11)
The delay limited SC C(full)s of the outlined scheme is the
maximum rate when the optimal power policy is used:
C(full)s (α,β)
.= max
γ(α,β)
R(full)s (α,β,γ(α, β)), s.t. (7). (12)
2) Absence of CSI Feedback: In the absence of CSI feed-
back (blind scenario), for a power allocation γm we define the
random variable:
R(bl)s (α, β, γ) =
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Å
log 1 + αmγm1 + βmγm
ã+
. (13)
Our objective is to solve the maximization problem
max
γ
Eα,β
î
R(bl)s (α, β, γ)
ó
, s.t. (7). (14)
4B. Secrecy Outage Probability
Let the power policy γ satisfy (7). The probability of
secrecy outage (PSO) with respect to a target secrecy rate τ
is given by®
P
(full)
out (γ(α, β), τ)
.= Pr
(
R
(full)
s < τ
)
, full CSI
P
(bl)
out (γ, τ)
.= Pr
(
R
(bl)
s < τ
)
. blind
(15)
We note that the quantities (11) and (13) are continuous
increasing concave functions of γ, therefore instead of solving
the minimization of (15), which are non-convex problems, we
solve problem (12) for the full CSI case, and problem (14) for
the blind case, which are convex problems.
III. DYNAMIC PROGRAMMING FORMULATION OF THE
OPTIMAL POWER ALLOCATION
Regarding the formulation of the constrained optimization
problems that describe the optimal power allocation in BF-
AWGN channels, there are three options regarding the timeline
of events:
1) Blind scenario: no CSI information is available when
the decision on the power allocation is made.
2) Acausal full CSI scenario: the full M -block CSI is
available at the beginning of the transmission frame.
3) Casual full CSI scenario: the m-th block CSI is fedback
to the transmitter before the decision on the m-th block
power allocation is made but no future CSI is available.
We investigate cases 1) and 3) using DP while case 2) has
been solved in [25] as a convex optimization problem leading
to the secure waterfilling algorithm.
In further detail, the maximization problems (12) and (14)
can be written as stochastic dynamic programs as follows:
We define the stages m = 1, . . . ,M , of the DP to be
the transmission blocks. We let the state of the DP be the
remaining power pm at stage m and the decisions of the DP
to be the power used at the current block m, γm. We denote
by Vm(pm) (called the value function) the expected value of
the secrecy rate gained from block m to the end of the horizon
if the optimal power allocation policy is used.
Then, in the blind scenario the DP is written as:
Vm(pm) =
max
0≤γm≤pm
Eαm,βm
ñÅ
log 1 + αmγm1 + βmγm
ã+
+ Vm+1(pm − γm)
ô
VM (pM ) = 0. (16)
In the blind scenario the action space is simply γm ∈ [0, pm].
On the other hand, in the causal scenario we define an
extended action space Am that incorporates a check on the
positiveness of the SC of the m-th block. We define δm =
αm − βm. The SC of the block m is non-zero as long as
1{δm>0} = 1, where 1{·} denotes the indicator function. Then,
the DP is written as:
Vm(pm) = max
γm∈Am
Å
log 1 + αmγm1 + βmγm
ã+
+ Eαm+1,βm+1 [Vm+1(pm − γm)] (17)
Am =
{
γm : 0 ≤ γm ≤ pm1{δm>0}
}
VM (pM ) = 0.
In the sequel we derive an analytic solution to (16) but not
to (17). Even though the DP in (17) can be approximated
computationally using appropriate discretization of the state,
control space and outcome space of the random channels, we
resort to approximate solutions that we can obtain in closed
form. The closed form sub-optimal power allocations can be
calculated in negligible computational time that is well suited
for real-time applications with delay constraints of less than
1− 5 msec, for example in 5G networks. If we let D be the
number of discrete values that we use to discretize the power
region and we let W be the number of discrete values we
use to discretize the outcome space of the random channels α
and β, then the complexity of numerically evaluating the DP
is proportional to MD2W 2. Even though this is polynomial
in these parameters, it is still not fast enough for real-time
implementation, especially if large values of D and W are
used to ensure a good approximation of the discretization.
IV. OPTIMAL POWER CONTROL IN THE BLIND SCENARIO
We assume a power constraint over M blocks in the form of
(7). Accordingly, the channel gains of the legitimate user and
the eavesdropper are assumed stationary over time with known
expected values µα and µβ respectively and realizations αm
and βm during the m-th block. We first consider the case
in which we take a decision on the value of γ without
having information on the CSI (α,β). In this formulation,
our objective is to solve (14). As we will see, this formulation
is equivalent to the quasi-static case with M = 1, perfect CSI
at the receiver and no CSI at the transmitter.
Proposition 1: The problem described in (14) is solved by
the power allocation policy γ′ = (γ′1, . . . , γ′M ) that corre-
sponds to equidistribution of the available power, i.e.,
γ′m = P,m = 1, . . . ,M. (18)
Proof : See Appendix A.
We note that in delay unconstrained applications, i.e. for
M →∞, the secrecy rate
1
M
M−1∑
m=0
Eαm,βm
ñÅ
log 1 + αmP1 + βmP
ã+ô
(19)
is achievable as the codewords can be multiplexed over all
channel realizations in the ergodic setting; this rate corre-
sponds to the ergodic SC with only receiver CSI. On the
other hand, for finite M , it is not guaranteed that this secrecy
rate can be achieved; albeit, the optimal transmission strategy
with respect to objective (14) is still the equidistribution of the
available power.
The above result agrees with intuition; as expected, due
to symmetry the blind maximization of a function of the
outcomes of M independent trials can be achieved by equally
allocating the resources. An upper bound for the minimum
PSO for a target secrecy rate τ and a frame based power
constraint as in (7) can derived by using the blind policy and
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min
γ
P
(bl)
out (γ, τ) ≤ P (bl)out (P, τ)
= Pr
(
1
M
M∑
m=1
Å
log 1 + αmP1 + βmP
ã+
< τ
)
= Pr
(Å
log 1 + αP1 + βP
ã+
< τ
)
, (20)
where the generic random variables α, β have the same un-
derlying pdf as the random variables αm, βm,m = 1, . . . ,M .
When no CSI is fedback to the transmitter, the PSO of the BF-
AWGN channel reduces to the PSO of a quasi-static channel
with M = 1. As a result, in the blind case the frequency or the
time diversity (expressed through M > 1) does not translate
into any gain in terms of PSO, in contrary to the full CSI case
as will be demonstrated in sections V-VI.
Assuming a Rayleigh scattering environment, then α, β
follow exponential distributions with pdfs expressed as:
fα(α) =
1
µα
e−
α
µα , fβ(β) =
1
µβ
e
− βµβ , (21)
and corresponding cumulative distribution functions (cdf)
Fα(α) = 1− e− αµα , Fβ(β) = 1− e−
β
µβ , (22)
with mean values µα and µβ respectively. Notably, in [5] the
negative result that the PSO of quasi-static Rayleigh channels
is bounded away from 0 even for diminishing secrecy rates
τ → 0 was obtained and the PSO was expressed as:
P
(bl)
out (P, τ)
∣∣∣
τ→0
= µβ
µα + µβ
. (23)
Naturally, in statistically equivalent fading conditions with
µα = µβ half of the transmission blocks will most likely be
in a secrecy outage, even for diminishing target secrecy rates.
However, in the following we will show that this negative
effect can be overcome in networks with receiver diversity of
orders K and E for the legitimate user and the eavesdropper
respectively, as long as K > E. Receiver diversity of orders
K and E can occur either by using K and E receive antennas
at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper, respectively, or
through a max SNR channel allocation policy in a network
with K legitimate terminals and E malicious nodes. To sim-
plify some of the mathematical derivations we further assume
that statistical equivalence holds with µα = µβ = 1 and that
we are in the high SNR regime, i.e., P  1.
Considering diversity orders K and E, the channel gain of
the legitimate user α and of the eavesdropper β correspond
to the K-th and E-th order statistic, respectively, of fα(α)
and fβ(β). In the absence of cooperation, the distributions
f
(K)
K (α) of α = maxk∈{1,...,K}(αk) and f
(E)
E (β) of β =
maxj∈{1,...,E}(βj) are then given by
f
(K)
K (α) = KFα(α)K−1fα(α), (24)
f
(E)
E (β) = EFβ(β)E−1fβ(β). (25)
On the other hand, if the full diversity is exploited and
the optimal maximum ratio combiner (MRC) receivers are
employed, then the distributions f (K)(α) of α = ∑Kk=1 αk
and f (E)(β) of β = ∑Ej=1 βk can be expressed as [26]:
f (K)(α) = Kα
K−1e−α
(K − 1)! , f
(E)(β) = Eβ
E−1e−β
(E − 1)! . (26)
Finally, in the high SNR regime, i.e., for P  1, the
following limits hold:
lim
P→∞
Å
log 1 + αP1 + βP
ã+
=
Å
log α
β
ã+
, (27)
lim
P→∞
(
log 1 +
∑K
k=1 αkP
1 +∑Ej=1 βiP
)+
=
(
log
∑K
k=1 αk∑E
j=1 βj
)+
. (28)
From (25) and (27) the minimum PSO w.r.t. a target
transmission rate τ in the non-cooperative case can be upper
bounded by
P
(bl,nc)
out (K,E, τ) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
K(1− e−x)K−1e−x∫ x2−τ
0
E(1− e−y)E−1e−ydydx
= KΓ(K)
E∑
n=1
(−1)n+1
Ç
E
n
å
Γ(n2−τ + 1)
Γ(K + n2−τ + 1) .(29)
For diminishing τ → 0 (29) simplifies to:
P
(bl,nc)
out
∣∣∣
τ→0
= E
K + E . (30)
Furthermore, from (26) and (28) the minimum PSO with
full diversity can on the other hand be upper bounded by
P
(bl,co)
out (K,E, τ) = 1−
∫ ∞
0
KxK−1e−x
(K − 1)!∫ x2−τ
0
EyE−1e−y
(E − 1)! dydx
= 1−
∑K−1
n=0
(
K+E−1
n
)
2nτ
(1 + 2τ )K+E−1 . (31)
For τ → 0 and using ∑kn=0 (kn) = 2k, the PSO with full
diversity can be expressed as
P
(bl,co)
out
∣∣∣
τ→0
=
∑K+E−1
n=K
(
K+E−1
n
)
2K+E−1 (32)
≤
(
K+E−1
K
)
2K , (33)
where for the derivation of the bound (33) we have used
that
∑n
k=q
(
n
k
)(
k
q
)
= 2n−q
(
n
q
)
and that
(
n
q
) ≤ (nk)(kq) for
n ≥ q. The asymptotic expressions for the PSO in (30)
and (33) demonstrate the dramatic impact of diversity in
the feasibility of secrecy in statistically equivalent Rayleigh
channels. Notably, the exponential decay of the asymptotic
PSO in the fully cooperative case underlines the potential for
exploiting PLS techniques in networks in which the intended
destinations have large diversity orders, e.g. cooperative sensor
networks or massive single input multiple output (SIMO)
systems. On the other hand, these same expressions highlight
the limitations of PLS approaches in coordinated attacks from
multiple eavesdroppers.
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The optimal power allocation policy assuming that at the
beginning of the transmission frame the CSI of M (parallel)
blocks is revealed to the transmitting and receiving nodes has
been derived in [25]. It is repeated below for completeness as it
will be used for comparison in the numerical experiments. This
is the baseline secure waterfilling policy and its performance
cannot be exceeded in the causal or blind scenario.
Proposition 2: Without loss of generality we assume that the
pairs of channel gains (αm, βm), m = 1, . . . ,M are already
permuted so that the differences
δm = αm − βm (34)
appear in non-increasing order. We further define the inverse
channel gaps dm as:
dm =
1
βm
− 1
αm
. (35)
The power allocation γ∗ = (γ∗0 , . . . , γ∗M−1) that achieves the
acausal BF-AWGN SC
C(full)s (α,β) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
Å
log 1 + αmγ
∗
m
1 + βmγ∗m
ã+
(36)
and satisfies the M -block power constraint (7) with equality
is given by the secure waterfilling algorithm:
γ∗m
Å 1
λ
ã
= 12
ñ…
d2m +
4
λ
dm −
Å 2
αm
+ dm
ãô
· 1{m∈Q}
(37)
where Q = {i : λ−1 ≥ δi−1}.
Proof: See [25].
The functions γ∗m(λ−1) are monotone increasing and con-
tinuous in λ−1. As a result, there exists a unique integer
µ in {1, . . . ,M} such that λ−1 ≥ δm−1 for m ≤ µ
and λ−1 < δm−1 for m > µ. The waterlevel λ−1 can
be derived by sequentially pouring water to the functions
γ∗m(λ−1) until the power constraint is met with equality, i.e.,∑µ
m=0 γ
∗
m(λ−1) = MP .
Finally, in this case the minimum PSO is a deterministic
step function with threshold τ :
min
γ
P
(full)
out (γ, τ) = 1{C(full)s (α,β)<τ} (38)
VI. NEAR-OPTIMAL POWER CONTROL WITH CAUSAL
FULL CSI
In the current section we investigate the case in which
during the m-th transmission block we causally obtain infor-
mation regarding the channel state, i.e., the pair (αm, βm) is
causally revealed to the transmitter before the decision on γm
is made. In this setting, during the m-th transmission block, we
have to solve the optimization problem given in (17). Unlike
the blind case, we were not able to find analytic solutions to
(17). Further, as discussed in section III, instead of numerically
evaluating the DP, we resort to approximation methods that
provide us with closed form solutions, which are evaluated
in negligible computational times. We will find near-optimal
solutions to the problem in (17) in three different cases; in the
low SNR regime, in the high SNR regime and finally using
a universal approximation that incorporates the blind scenario
policy.
A. Low SNR Regime
In the low SNR regime, the available power is assumed
small, i.e., P  1. As a result a valid linear approximation of
the logarithmic function would be log(1 + z) ' z, leading to
an approximate expression for the m-th block SC given by:
c(full)s (αm, βm, γm) ' (αm − βm)+γm = (δm)+γm, (39)
with δm defined in (34). Using the above approximation and
substituting into the optimality equations (17) for the last two
frames m = M and m = M − 1 we get γ(th)M = pM1{δM>0}
and γ(th)M−1 = pM−11{(δM−1)+>E[(δ)+]}. Motivated by the
power allocation of the last two frames we propose the
following approximation:
Low SNR Approximation: In the low SNR regime, i.e, for
P  1, we approximate the solution to problem (17) by the
“threshold power allocation” γ(th) = (γ(th)1 , . . . , γ
(th)
M ) with
γ(th)m = pm1{(δm)+>E[(δ)+]} (40)
with p1 = MP and m = 1, . . . ,M . Using the threshold
policy, the SC in the low SNR regime can be approximated
by
C(full,lo)s ' (δm∗)+MP (41)
with m∗ denoting the smallest index m∗ ∈ {1, . . . ,M} that
satisfies (δm∗)+ > E
[
(δm∗)+
]
. In the proposed threshold
power policy, whenever a “good enough" gap in the channel
gains δm of the legitimate and the eavesdropping receivers
occurs then we transmit at full power MP . Intuitively, in
the low SNR regime there will not be many opportunities for
achieving high values of the per block SC, so whenever such
an opportunity occurs it should be seized.
Next, turning our attention to the case in which a minimum
secrecy rate τ should also be achieved, then the transmission
threshold needs to be set to τMP . At the end of the horizon
the PSO is a deterministic step function with threshold τ :
P
(full,lo)
out (τ) = 1{C(full,lo)s <τ} (42)
To evaluate the PSO at the beginning of the horizon, let us
denote by p the probability that during the m-th transmission
block the threshold τMP is not reached:
Pr
(
(δm)+ <
τ
MP
)
= p. (43)
As a result, the PSO at the beginning of the horizon with
causal CSI in the low SNR regime can be expressed as:
P
(full,lo)
out (τ) = pM . (44)
We note that even when the legitimate user’s channel is on
average worse than the eavesdropper’s, it can still be possible
to transmit at some non-zero rate in the low SNR regime,
given a long enough horizon, i.e., for large M .
7B. High SNR Regime
In the high SNR regime, i.e., for P  1, we can transmit at
very high power during any of the transmission blocks. A good
approximation for the SC during the m-th block is derived as
lim
γ→∞ c
(full)
s (αm, βm, γm) =
(
log αm
βm
)+
. (45)
The SC is as a result independent of the power allocation
and any transmission policy γm ∈ Am could be used. We
propose the use of a high power allocation policy as below:
High SNR Approximation: In the high SNR regime, i.e, for
P  1, the solution to problem (17) can be approximated by
the “high power allocation” γ(hi) = (γ(hi)1 , . . . , γ
(hi)
M ) with
γ(hi)m =
pm
M −m1{δm>0} (46)
with p1 = MP and m = 1, . . . ,M . The SC can be
approximated by
C(full,hi)s '
1
M
M∑
m=1
(
log αm
βm
)+
. (47)
At the end of the horizon, the PSO is a deterministic step
function with threshold τ :
P
(full,hi)
out (τ) = 1{C(full,hi)s <τ}. (48)
On the other hand, at the beginning of the horizon the SC is
the sum of M i.i.d. random variables. Using the central limit
theorem and denoting by µ and σ2 the mean value and the
variance of the per block SC, the M -block BF-AWGN channel
SC can be approximated by a Gaussian random variable with
mean value µ and variance σ
2
M . As a result, at the beginning
of the horizon the PSO can be expressed as:
P
(full,hi)
out (τ) = Pr
Ä
C(full,hi)s < τ
ä
=
∫ τ
0
√
M√
2piσ2
exp
Å
−M(x− µ)
2
2σ2
ã
dx
= 12erf
Ç…
M
2σ2µ
å
− 12erf
Ç…
M
2σ2 (µ− τ)
å
. (49)
As M increases the variance of the PSO at the beginning of the
horizon decreases. In the limiting case of the ergodic channel,
i.e., for M →∞, the SC converges to µ and the PSO becomes
a step function with threshold µ.
C. Blind Horizon Approximation (BHA)
In this subsection a novel universal approximation is derived
by incorporating the blind policy in the horizon of future
events. Suppose that we have the current CSI at block m,
αm and βm when we take the power allocation decision γm.
The optimality equations for this model are expressed in (17).
We use the approximation
Eαm+1,βm+1 [Vm+1(pm − γm)]
' (M −m)c(full)s
Å
µα, µβ ,
pm − γm
M −m
ã
, (50)
where µα and µβ are the expected values of the channel
gains of the legitimate user and the eavesdropper respec-
tively. The proposed approximation for the horizon of future
events reduces future values of the channel gains to their
expected values; as a result, in the future the optimal power
allocation is the equidistribution of the resources and (50)
follows straightforwardly. We note in passing that due to
Jensen’s inequality and the concavity of the function Vm+1
the proposed approximation overestimates the return of the
value function in the horizon of future events leading to a
conservative strategy for the present.
BHA Approximation: The solution to problem (17) can be
approximated by the “blind horizon approximation (BHA)
power allocation” γ(bha) = (γ(bha)1 , . . . , γ
(bha)
M ) with
γ(bha)m =

%m, if αm > βm and µα > µβ ,
γ
(th)
m if αm > βm and µα ≤ µβ ,
0, otherwise,
(51)
where %m =
(
min(x(m)2 , pm)
)+
and x(m)2 is the second root
of
d
dγm
{
c(full)s (αm, βm, γm)
+ (M −m)c(full)s
(
µα, µβ ,
pm − γm
M −m
)}
= 0.
Derivation of BHA policy: See Appendix B.
VII. NUMERICAL RESULTS
A. No CSI Feedback
In this subsection we present results for the PSO in the blind
scenario. In Figs. 1 and 2 the PSOs (29) and (31) for a target
secrecy rate τ = 1 bit/sec/Hz are depicted. Similarly to the
asymptotic PSO in (30) and (33) for diminishing τ → 0, the
effect of cooperation proves a decisive factor in identifying an
operational region in which a secrecy outage occurs with very
high probability and a region in which the PSO is negligible.
In particular, as shown in Fig. 2, when exploiting the full
diversity the network exhibits a phase transition characteristic
in terms of secrecy.
Furthermore, in Fig. 3 we plot the minimum required num-
ber of diversity order K versus the diversity order E in order
to ensure the secret transmission of τ = {0.1, 1, 2} bit/sec/Hz
with a 99% certainty, i.e., for P (bl,co)out (K,E, τ) < 0.01.
Notably, in the presence of a single eavesdropper without
diversity (E = 1), this can be achieved when the intended
destination has a diversity order K = {6, 11, 20} respectively.
B. Full CSI Feedback
In this subsection, we present numerical evaluations of the
average secrecy rates when various transmission policies are
adopted in Nakagami-m channels. The channel gains αm and
βm follow a Gamma distribution
fX (x) =
1
Γ(m)θmx
m−1e−
x
θ (52)
with mean value µ = mθ. For m = 1 the Nakagami-m
channel is equivalent to a Rayleigh channel while for m→∞
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Fig. 1. PSO for the blind policy in the non-cooperative case for τ = 1
bit/sec/Hz and diversity orders K and E.
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Fig. 2. PSO for the blind policy in the cooperative case for τ = 1 bit/sec/Hz
and diversity orders K and E.
it is equivalent to an AWGN channel. In Fig. 4 the average
secrecy rates per block achieved by the causal BHA policy and
the acausal waterfilling are depicted for Rayleigh scattering
with m = 1, µβ = 1 and M = 10. The average legitimate
user SNR is set to µαP and the results are averaged over
1000 channel realizations. Interestingly, as long as µα is
distinctively greater than µβ , we loose almost no secrecy rate -
in absolute terms - due to the causal nature of the CSI feedback
over the entire SNR axis.
In the second set of simulations we compare the average
secrecy rates achieved by the various transmission policies,
normalized to the secure waterfilling SC for Nakagami-m
channels with m = 1, 2. We set M = 10, µβ = 1 and the
average legitimate user SNR to µαP . In Figs. 5 and 6 we
depict the secrecy rates for µα = 0.1, 1.01, 5, averaged over
1000 channel realizations. We note that the waterfilling rate is
not achievable in the case of causal CSI. It can be seen that
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Fig. 3. Minimum K required to transmit 0.1, 1 and 2 bit/sec/Hz with
P
(bl,co)
out
′
< 0.01 as a function of E.
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Fig. 4. Average secrecy rates achieved with causal BHA policy and acausal
waterfilling policy for various policies for µβ = 1 and M = 10.
the threshold policy outperforms the high power policy in the
low SNRs and vice versa in the high SNRs. Furthermore, the
high power policy always outperforms the blind policy as in
the latter part of the power budget is spent on blocks with
zero SC when αm < βm. On the other hand, for µα ≤ µβ the
BHA policy coincides with the threshold policy. In this case
the BHA policy is not optimal in all SNR and is outperformed
in the intermediate and high SNR regimes by the high power
policy. The same is true for µα ' µβ . However, when µα
is distinctly greater than µβ the secrecy rate achieved with
the BHA policy is greater than the rates achieved with the
threshold and the high power policy over the entire SNR axis.
Furthermore, in Fig. 7 the effect of the horizon length is
investigated. We plot the acausal SC and average secrecy rates
for the BHA and the blind policies for Nakagami-m channels
with m = 1, 2, 10, block SNR set to 10 dB and various block
lengths. It can be concluded that for M > 10, the various al-
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Fig. 5. Average secrecy rates of Nakagami-1 channels normalized to the
acausal waterfilling rate achieved with various policies and µβ = 1, M = 10,
: threshold policy, : high power policy, o: blind policy, *: BHA policy
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Fig. 6. Average secrecy rates of Nakagami-2 channels
normalized to the acausal waterfilling policy achieved
with various policies and µβ = 1, M = 10,
: threshold policy, : high power policy, o: blind policy, *: BHA policy
gorithms converge to their asymptotic values which have been
evaluated for the ergodic scenario as {1.3016, 1.1792, 1.0066}
bps/Hz, respectively. Notably for m = 1, 2 the asymptotic
values and the ergodic values coincide, while for m = 10, we
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Fig. 7. Secrecy rates achieved with the blind policy, the causal BHA policy
and the acausal waterfilling for Nakagami channels with m = 1, 2, 10 and
block SNR=10 dB.
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Fig. 8. PSO at the beginning of the horizon with causal CSI in the low SNR
regime.
observe a small gap indicating a very slow convergence as M
increases. Furthermore, the lack of a line of sight component
(LOS) in the Rayleigh channel increases the M -block SC
compared to channels with LOS (i.e., for m = 2) or that
are closer to an AWGN channel (for m = 10). The increasing
variance of Nakagami-m channels with decreasing m results
in a larger “variability” in the channel coefficients that can
provide notable gains in terms of secrecy when compared to
AWGN channels.
Finally, in Figs. 8 and 9 we depict the PSO at the beginning
of the horizon in the causal CSI scenario in the low and
the high SNR regimes. The PSO in the high SNR regime is
evaluated at M = 10 and expected value µ = 2 and variance
σ2 = 1 for the per block SC. In both cases it is possible to
determine regions with negligible PSO values and design the
wireless network accordingly.
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Fig. 9. PSO at the beginning of the horizon with causal CSI in the high SNR
regime.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In the present work we have investigated the optimal power
allocation in delay constrained M -block BF-AWGN networks.
By studying the blind case with no CSI availability during the
decision process we have concluded that the optimal policy
consists of equally distributing the power along the transmis-
sion blocks. Remarkably, it has been demonstrated that in a
fully cooperative network the PSO decays exponentially fast
in Rayleigh channels with the diversity order of the legitimate
user for small secrecy rates. The PSO in the general case
exhibits a phase transition that allows to identify an operational
region in which the transmission of secret messages with a
very high probability is guaranteed even in absence of CSI
feedback. As an example, with full diversity of order 11 in the
presence of an eavesdropper without diversity it is possible
to transmit 1 bit/sec/Hz with perfect secrecy in 99% of the
transmission blocks.
Furthermore, we have outlined the benchmark secure wa-
terfilling algorithm that achieves the M -block BF-AWGN
channel SC when the full CSI is acausally available to the
transmitter. Next, the study of networks with causal access
to the CSI has been performed accounting for three distinct
cases; the low and the high SNR regimes and a novel universal
approximation. In the low SNR regime we have derived a near
optimal threshold policy whereas in the high SNR regime
a high power transmission policy has been shown to be
near optimal. Finally, by incorporating the blind policy in
the horizon of future events we have been able to derive
a novel universal approximation that we have denoted as
“the blind horizon approximation” (BHA). Through numerical
evaluations for Nakagami-m channels it has been shown that
the BHA compares favorably with the benchmark waterfilling
policy in the acausal feedback case and consistently outper-
forms the threshold and high power transmission policies as
long as the mean legitimate user’s SNR is greater than the
mean eavesdropper’s SNR.
Future extensions of this work will include semi-blind
scenarios in which only the legitimate user CSI is fedback
to the transmitter.
APPENDIX
A. Proof of Proposition 1
Let γ = (γ1, . . . , γM ). Due to the stationarity of the BF-
AWGN channel, the stochastic optimization objective function
can be written as follows:
max
γ
Eα,β
î
R(bl)s
ó
= max
γ
Eα,β
ï(1 + αγ
1 + βγ
)+ò
(53)
where the expectation is written with rapport to the generic
random variables α and β. We define the function:
f(γ) ≡ Eα,β
ï
log
(1 + αγ
1 + βγ
)+ò
. (54)
Then, the problem in (53) can be written as a stochastic DP as
follows: We let Vm(pm) be the expected value of the secrecy
rate gained from block m to the end of the horizon if the
optimal power allocation policy is used. Then the DP equations
can be written as:
Vm(pm) = max
0≤γm≤pm
f(γm) + Vm+1(pm − γm)
for m = 1, . . . ,M − 1 (55)
VM (pM ) = 0.
Gm = (αm − βm)[−4αmµ2ββmµαL2mp2m + 4αmµ2αβmL2mp2mµβ − µ2ββm + αmµ2β − µ2αβm + µ2ααm
− 4αmµ2βµαL2mpm − 4αmµ2βbLmpm + 4αmµ2αβmLmpm + 4αmµ2αL2mpmµβ − 4βmµ2βµαL2mpm
+ 4βmµ2αL2mpmµβ − µ2αL2mβm + αmµ2αL2m + αmL2mµ2β − βmL2mµ2β − 2αmµαL2mµβ + 2βmµαL2mµβ
− 2αmµ2βLm − 2βmµ2βLm − 4µβαmβm + 4µ2αL2mµβ − 4µαL2mµ2βµ2αLm + 2βmµ2αLm
+ 2βmµαµβm + 2αm + 4µααmβm − 2αmµαµβ ].
dgm
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=0
= [µαµβL
2
m(αm − βm)]p2m + [Lm(αm − βm)(µα + µβ)]pm + [(αm − βm)− (µα − µβ)]
(1 + µαLmpm)(1 + µβLmpm)
dgm
dγ
∣∣∣∣
γ=pm
= [−αmβm(µα − µβ)]p
2
m + [−(µα − µβ)(αm + βm)]pm + [(αm − βm)− (µα − µβ)]
(1 + αmpm)(1 + βmpm)
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We perform backward DP on the optimality equations (55).
We start the recursion at block m = M , where the optimality
equations are:
VM (pM ) = max
0≤γM≤pM
f(γM ), (56)
Since f is nondecreasing, the maximization in (56) is achieved
at γ′M = pM . Thus, we have: γ′M = pM and VM (pM ) =
f(pM ). Thus, at block m = M − 1 the optimality equations
are:
VM−1(pM−1) = max
0≤γM−1≤pM−1
f(γM−1) + f(pM−1 − γM−1).
(57)
Let h(γ) = f(γ) + f(p − γ). Note that dh(γ)dγ = df(γ)dγ −
df(p−γ)
dγ , and since
df(γ)
dγ is nonincreasing and
df(p−γ)
dγ is
nondecreasing in γ, we have that dh(γ)dγ is nonincreasing. This
means that it can have at most one extreme point in the
interval [0, pM−1], and the extreme point must be a maximum.
At γ = pM−12 we have:
dh(γ)
dγ |γ=pM−1/2 = 0. Therefore
in (57) the maximum is achieved at γ′M−1 =
pM−1
2 and
VM−1(pM−1) = 2f(pM−12 ).
Continuing the recursion we get
VM−n(pM−n) = (n+ 1)f
(pM−n
n+ 1
)
(58)
and the optimal decision is γ′M−n =
pM−n
n+1 . This implies that
if we have no information about the channel the optimal thing
to do is to divide the power into as many equal parts as there
are periods remaining, i.e., for m = 1, . . . ,M γ′m = P .
B. Derivation of the BHA Approximation
The proposed approximation for Vm is given as:
Vˆm(pm) = max
γm∈Am
gm(γm), (59)
where gm is as follows:
gm(γ) = c(full)s (αm, βm, γ)+(M−m)c(full)s
Å
µα, µβ ,
pm − γ
M −m
ã
,
(60)
1) Case I: αm > βm and µα > µβ: When αm > βm and
µα > µβ the function gm can be rewritten as:
gm(γ) = log
Å1 + αmγ
1 + βmγ
ã
+ (M −m) log
(
1 + µα pm−γM−m
1 + µβ pm−γM−m
)
.
(61)
Taking dgm(γ)dγ = 0 gives the following roots:
(x(m)1 , x
(m)
2 ) =
(
Em +
√
Gm
2Fm
,
Em −
√
Gm
2Fm
)
(62)
where Em, Fm are given below and Gm is given at the bottom
of the previous page. For simplicity of notation we let Lm =
1
M−m :
Em = 2µαµβL2m(αm − βm)pm + [Lm(αm − βm)
× (µα + µβ) + (αm + βm)(µα − µβ)],
Fm = µαµβL2m(αm − βm)− αmβm(µα − µβ),
When αm > βm and µα > µβ , Gm ≥ 0.
To prove that x(m)1 is always outside the interval [0, pm],
we have two cases, according to the sign of Fm: for Fm > 0,
x
(m)
1 ≥ Em2Fm > pm, while for Fm < 0, x
(m)
1 < 0.
Regarding whether x(m)2 is in the interval [0, pm] we first
calculate the derivative of gm at points 0 and pm, given at
the bottom of the previous page. If (αm − βm) ≥ (µα − µβ),
then dgmdγ
∣∣
γ=0 ≥ 0. Since only one root of dgmdγ can exist
in the interval [0, pm], then the root (the maximum) must be
outside of the interval [0, pm], x(m)2 ≥ pm, and the maximum
is achieved at pm. However, if dgmdγ < 0 then the root must
be in [0, pm] and the maximum is achieved at x2. Thus the
maximum in [0, pm] is achieved at min(x(m)2 , pm). If on the
other hand (αm − βm) < (µα − µβ), then dgmdγ ≤ 0. Since
only one root of dgmdγ can exist in the interval [0, pm], then the
root (the maximum) must be outside of the interval [0, pm],
x
(m)
2 ≤ 0 and the maximum is achieved at 0. However, ifdgm
dγ > 0 then the root must be in [0, pm] and the maximum
is achieved at x(m)2 . Thus the maximum in [0, pm] is achieved
at max(0, x(m)2 ). This gives the power allocation in (51).
2) Case II: αm > βm and µα < µβ: When αm > βm and
µα < µβ the function gm can be rewritten as:
gm(γ) = log
Å1 + αmγ
1 + βmγ
ã
(63)
and the BHA reduces to the threshold policy so that γ(bha)m =
pm.
3) Case III: αm < βm : When αm < βm the function gm
can be rewritten as:
gm(γ) = (M −m) log
(
1 + µα pm−γM−m
1 + µβ pm−γM−m
)
(64)
and the optimal BHA policy is to allocate no power, i.e.,
γ
(bha)
m = 0.
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